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Abstract
This article argues that it is legitimate for the state to prac-
tice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds in
order to prevent behaviour that is discriminatory. Liberals
accept that it is not legitimate for the state to intervene in
order to change how people think because ideas and beliefs
are wrong in themselves. It is legitimate for the state to
intervene with the actions of a person only when there is a
risk of harm to others and when there is a threat to social
coexistence. Preventive action of the state is legitimate if we
consider the immaterial and material harm that discrimi-
nation causes. It causes harm to the social standing of the
person, psychological harm, economic and existential harm.
All these harms threaten peaceful social coexistence. This
article traces a theory of permissible government action.
Research in the areas of behavioural psychology, neuro-
science and social psychology indicates that it is possible to
bring about a change in hearts and minds. Encouraging a
person to adopt the perspective of the person who has
experienced discrimination can lead to empathetic under-
standing. This, can lead a person to critically evaluate her
prejudice. The paper argues that soft paternalism towards
changing hearts and minds is legitimate in order to prevent
harm to others. It attempts to legitimise state coercion in
order to eliminate prejudice and broader social patterns of
inequality and marginalisation. And it distinguishes between
appropriate and non-appropriate avenues the state could
pursue in order to eliminate prejudice. Policies towards elim-
inating prejudice should address the rational and the emo-
tional faculties of a person. They should aim at using meth-
ods and techniques that focus on persuasion and reduce
coercion. They should raise awareness of what prejudice is
and how it works in order to facilitate well-informed volun-
tary decisions. The version of soft paternalism towards
changing minds and attitudes defended in this article makes
it consistent with liberalism.
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1 Introduction
Is it legitimate for the state to change hearts and minds?
Liberals accept that it is not legitimate for the state to
intervene in in this area because ideas and beliefs are
wrong in themselves. Changing how human beings
think requires an additional justification to the extent
that state paternalism is demeaning as it means treating
citizens as immature human beings. There is always a
danger of sliding into illiberalism. Only when there is a
risk of harm to others and when there is a threat to
social coexistence is it legitimate for the state to do so.
For instance, anti-discrimination law aims to tackle ster-
eotypes and prejudice, ways of thinking that materialise
in acts that have discriminatory effects upon some per-
sons who are classified as members of some groups.1
Stereotypical and prejudicial thinking is wrong and cau-
ses harm because it projects characteristics upon a per-
son and dictates attitudes towards a person that deprive
him/her of advantages.2 Harm is in these cases both
material and immaterial. The evaluation of a stereotype
or a prejudice relates to the social meaning of acts.3 It
focuses on the wider social, cultural and historical con-
texts that discriminatory acts accentuate.4 Anti-discri-
mination law aims to tackle a social environment that is
demeaning.
This article traces a theory of permissible government
action. It argues that soft paternalism towards changing
hearts and minds is legitimate in order to prevent harm
to others. It attempts to legitimise state coercion in
order to eliminate prejudice and broader social patterns
1. The tension for liberalism inherent in enforcing anti-discrimination law is
analysed with great accuracy by John Gardner in ‘Liberals and Unlawful
Discrimination’, 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1989).
2. On prejudice as projection of qualities that deprive a person of the
opportunity to define her personality and show it to others, see I. Tour-
kochoriti, ‘“Should Hate Speech be Protected?” Group Defamation,
Party Bans, Holocaust Denial and the Divide Between (France) Europe-
U.S.A.’, 45(2) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 552-622 (2014).
3. On focusing on the social meaning of an act as expressing moral inferi-
ority in order to define when discrimination is wrong, see A. Sangiovan-
ni, Humanity without Dignity (2017), at 122.
4. See D. Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (2008), at 35.
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of inequality and marginalisation in narrowly limited
circumstances. And it distinguishes between appropriate
and non-appropriate avenues the state could pursue in
order to eliminate prejudice. Policies towards eliminat-
ing prejudice should address the rational and the emo-
tional faculties of a person. They should aim at using
methods and techniques that focus on persuasion and
reduce coercion. They should raise awareness of what
prejudice is and how it works in order to facilitate well-
informed voluntary decisions. The version of soft pater-
nalism towards changing minds and attitudes defended
in this article makes it consistent with liberalism.
Changing ‘hearts and minds’ means, for the purposes of
this article, changing ways of feeling, of thinking and of
evaluating knowledge. The perspective adopted presup-
poses that cognition is affected both by emotion and rea-
son. Research in the area of behavioural psychology,
neuroscience and social psychology indicates that both
reason and emotion are at play in human cognition. It
also indicates that it is possible to bring about a change
in hearts and minds. Encouraging a person to adopt the
perspective of the person who experiences discrimi-
nation can lead to sympathetic understanding of her
situation. Activating sympathetic understanding can
lead a person to critically evaluate her prejudice. This
evaluation can help her better apply the criterion of uni-
versalisability in her reflection on what rights persons
should have.
This article aims to make a contribution to the literature
on anti-discrimination law by providing an interdiscipli-
nary approach and a multilevel analysis of discriminato-
ry prejudice. It aims to make normative proposals by
using conclusions of research in empirical science on
what prejudice is and how it leads to discrimination. In
this respect it uses data existing in recent research in the
areas of behavioural psychology, neuroscience and social
psychology. This study is divided into four parts. Part
one offers an analysis of the types of harm that discrimi-
nation causes. In this respect, it analyses what prejudice
is and how it works. Part two deals with whether it is
possible to change hearts and minds. It presents
research from the areas of behavioural psychology,
social psychology and neuroscience to make the case
that it is possible. Part three discusses whether it is
legitimate for the state to change hearts and minds. In
this respect it engages with Kant, Mill, Locke and
Rawls. Part four discusses legal tools that exist and
others that have been proposed. These legal tools can
create a consciousness that discrimination is wrong and
can, in the long term, lead to changing hearts and
minds.
2 What is the Harm Caused by
Discrimination?
For liberals to be able to defend government interven-
tion in changing hearts and minds, it is compelling to
increase consciousness about the harm that a person
experiences. This harm can be defined in multiple ways.
First, there is a harm to the social standing of the per-
son. Discrimination perpetuates and accentuates a social
context of oppression and marginalisation. Further, the
harm to social standing leads to experiencing psycholog-
ical harm. A person is made to feel inferior. Thirdly,
there is material harm. Discrimination affects the distri-
bution of rights and goods that a person gets. She may
be denied access to professional opportunity or a good
that she needs. Finally, there is an existential harm to
the extent that discrimination affects the opportunities
that a person has to improve her situation. In what fol-
lows I analyse each of these types of harm.
In order to be able to evaluate the harm that discrimi-
nation causes, it is important to analyse how prejudice
works. Prejudice, praejudicium, can be a preliminary
rational judgment, as Gadamer has noted.5 It can also be
due to a hasty emotional response. The Latin etymology
of the term prae-judicium points towards the idea of a
preliminary judgment. This preliminary judgment can
be formed on the basis of various conscious and uncon-
scious factors. Gordon Alport provided in his study on
Prejudice, which is the work of reference in social psy-
chology, a definition of prejudice as “thinking ill of
others without sufficient warrant”.6 Research has shown
that discriminatory behaviour is not only motivational
but also cognitive.7 Prejudice has a cognitive compo-
nent, an emotional component and a behavioural com-
ponent, which form parts of an integrated whole.8 Prej-
udice is associated with stereotyping, the creation of cat-
egories of projected expectations. These concern the
human qualities and the behaviour of a person. Preju-
dice and stereotyping lead to discriminatory behaviour.
This is relevant to both cases of direct or indirect discri-
mination. Human beings apply stereotypes related to
ability or other characteristics unconsciously. Uncon-
scious biases affect what decision-makers see and inter-
pret and how they evaluate persons.
Gordon Allport noted that forming in-group and out-
group mentality is part of human existence.9 Familiarity
provides a basis for our existence which is defined by
our membership in various social groups. These are
defined in reference to an out-group, or in other words a
“common enemy”.10 Research in the area of neuro-
science shows that our brains form in-group and out-
group dichotomies with stunning speed.11 This leads to
5. In his ‘Truth and Method’, (J. Weinshemere & D.G. Marshall trans., 2nd
ed.), at 272 seq.
6. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice [1954] (1979) 6.
7. See L.H. Krieger, ‘The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity’, 47
Stanford Law Review 1161, at 1164 (1994-1995).
8. Ibid., at 1174.
9. Gordon Allport, above n. 6, at 29.
10. As Allport notes, citing the French Biologist Felix le Dantec, ibid, 41.
Freud in his Civilization and its Discontents, argued that group forma-
tion is possible when a group redirects its natural aggressivity towards
an outgroup.
11. R. Sapolsky, Behave, The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst
(2017), at 388.
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rapid automatic biases. These biases are due to hor-
mones in the brain that prompt trust, generosity and
cooperation towards in-groups and worse behaviour
towards out-groups. Numerous experiments, again in
the area of neuroscience, have shown that the brain pro-
cesses within milliseconds differential images based on
cues about race or gender.12 These lead to numerous in-
group biases, such as higher levels of cooperation.
People feel positive associations with others who share
the most meaningless traits with them. By age three to
four, children have already grouped people by race and
gender, have negative views of others and perceive
other-race faces as being angrier than same-race faces.13
This is because children naturalize those social dimen-
sions that the ambient culture marks as especially sali-
ent.14 Thinking in terms of “race” is unthinkable in the
absence of culture and polity which create systems of
cultural beliefs and channel sets of expectations.15
Furthermore, social cognition theory has shown that
human thinking involves categorising. Human cognition
is based on forming categories.16 Categories help the
human mind impose some order upon the disorder of
the world. They also help make it predictable. Catego-
rising means turning ‘fuzzy’ differences into clear-cut
distinctions.17 Stereotyping is an extension of the func-
tioning of human cognition. Human beings learn to cre-
ate categories at a young age. This forms part of the evo-
lution of one’s cognitive capacities. Categorising is asso-
ciated with creating an exemplary member onto whom
are projected a number of qualities. Categorisation leads
to social stereotyping. Problems emerge because there is
some arbitrariness inherent in stereotyping that dictates
behaviour that deprives some persons of opportunities.
Stereotyping associates persons with characteristics that
belong to a group she is arbitrarily classified in. Chil-
dren and adults develop stereotypes and prejudices con-
cerning groups that are uncorrelated with any observa-
ble traits or behaviours.18 Stereotyping leads to essenti-
alist thinking, viewing out-groups as homogeneous and
interchangeable.19 The individuals stereotyped are seen
as monolithic and undifferentiated. These cognitions are
12. Ibid., at 389.
13. I.A. Hirschfield, ‘Natural Assumptions: Race, Essence and Taxonomies of
Human Kinds’, 65 Social Research 331-349 (1998), R.S. Bigler et al.,
‘Developmental Intergroup Theory: Explaining and Reducing Children’s
Social Stereotyping and Prejudice’, 16 Current Directions in Psychologi-
cal Science 162-166 (2007), A.S. Baron and M.R. Banaji, ‘The Develop-
ment of Implicit Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6,
10, and Adulthood’, 17 Psychological Science 53 (2006). See also F.E.
Aboud, Children and Prejudice (1988), R.S. Bigler et al., ‘Social Catego-
rization and the Formation of Intergroup Attitudes in Children’, 68
Child Development 530 (1997), cited by Sapolsky, above n. 11, at 391.
14. I.A. Hirschfield, ‘Natural Assumptions: Race, Essence and Taxonomies of
Human Kinds’, above n. 13, at 335.
15. Ibid.
16. Allport, above n. 6, at 20.
17. See Krieger, above n. 7, at 1189.
18. R.S. Bigler et al., ‘Developmental Intergroup Theory: Explaining and
Reducing Children’s Social Stereotyping and Prejudice’, above n. 13, at
165.
19. Sapolsky, above n. 11, at 399.
post hoc justifications for feelings and intuitions.20
Developmental Pshychologists argue that our cognitive
architecture makes some cultural representations possi-
ble and precludes others.21 And this architecture reso-
nates with regimes of power and authority.22
Stereotyping means associating a person with qualities
that are not necessarily chosen by her. This deprives her
of the opportunity to form her own persona and show it
to others. It is a violation of the autonomy of a person. It
is an attempt to her ability to define her personality for
herself and to show it to others. Discriminatory behav-
iour deprives a person of job opportunities and access to
goods and services for imagined qualities and character-
istics, which do not necessarily correspond with what
that person is. If prejudice operates in this way, then it
is legitimate for the government to engage in efforts that
modify these patterns of thinking. Unconscious preju-
dice manifests itself in cases of both direct discrimi-
nation and indirect discrimination.
In discriminatory employment decisions, characteristics
are used as proxies for job-related traits. Stereotyping
involves concrete expectations projected upon others on
the basis of characteristics that they have. If prejudice
has a cognitive component, an emotional component
and a behavioural component that form parts of an inte-
grated whole,23 it involves systematic biases in inter-
group judgment that can flow directly from stereotypes
that are unconscious. This is the case because group
mentality leads to a biased evaluation of in-group and
out-group members. Stereotyping serves as a heuristic
in our mental representations. It affects the evaluation
of the behaviour of a person and its projected behaviour.
It leads to all sorts of causal attributions that preclude
searching for other relevant information. It even leads to
projecting behaviours consistent with the stereotype
that did not actually occur.24 Social cognition theory has
shown that decision-making comprises perception,
interpretation, attribution, memory and judgment.
These operations take place in a way that is internalised
and becomes automatic. Intent to discriminate does not
necessarily play a role.
Having analysed how prejudice operates, it is now
important to explore the types of harm that discrimi-
nation causes. Discrimination expresses and consoli-
dates social power. Foucault has made us conscious that
power is omnipresent within societies.25 A constructive
reading of Foucault points towards raising awareness
about the complicated ways in which we exercise and
receive power. In this respect, his thought is very valua-
ble for anti-discrimination law towards conceptualising
20. J. Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment’, 108 Psychological Review 814 (2001),
J. Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Poli-
tics and Religion (2012).
21. I.A. Hirschfield, ‘Natural Assumptions: Race, Essence and Taxonomies of
Human Kinds’, at 349.
22. Ibid.
23. Krieger, above n. 7, at 1174.
24. Ibid., at 1208.
25. See for instance, M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Engl. transl. by
Robert Hurley (1990),at 92-95.
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the immaterial harm that discrimination causes. If
discrimination is caused by social power dynamics that
it in return perpetuates, then it is legitimate to use the
law in order to eliminate social power dynamics. Social
power is expressed by conscious and unconscious acts of
discrimination. It leads to the formation of stereotypes,
and it accentuates them. The harm that a person experi-
ences when she is facing discrimination relates to expe-
riencing negative consequences owing to a characteristic
that is arbitrarily projected to her and does not allow her
to show who she is to others.
Social power thus contributes to affecting the social
standing of some persons owing to stereotyping. As ana-
lysed earlier, this perception in relation to the social
standing is conscious and unconscious. Discrimination
is demeaning in that a person is depicted as not being of
equal moral worth to others.26 As Deborah Hellman has
noted, discriminatory behaviour is an expressive act.27 A
person is made to feel inferior. Discriminatory acts
demean or debase others. To demean someone has a
social and a power dimension.28 The omission takes
place in a context of unequal social power. If we accept
an understanding of human dignity according to which
human beings are entitled to unconditional respect, dis-
criminating means not showing this unconditional
respect. An example of this behaviour is placing an
additional burden upon women to prove their fitness for
a job opportunity. Context is very important for the
evaluation of the acts of respect and for the acts of
absence of respect.
Discrimination causes psychological harm as it leads to
the internationalisation of the projected stereotypes of a
person. A person is made to feel inferior to others.
Discrimination undermines what Andrea Sangiovanni
calls ‘the structural conditions for a flourishing life’.29
By that he means the social-relational dimensions of dis-
advantaging someone through discrimination. The
social relational element is not merely an aggravating
circumstance, Sangiovanni notes, but fundamentally
affects the wrongfulness of the act of discrimination. If,
as Hegel noted, the sense of self of a person is formed by
recognition,30 then treating another person as inferior in
this context undermines her ability to develop a sense of
herself as a moral agent. The person internalises the
feeling of disrespect and is prevented from forming her
self-respect. In other words, the person is negated what
Rawls calls the social basis of self-respect.31 Our self-
respect is formed in the web of relationships we have
with others and by the recognition of others. This can
have detrimental effects on the very sense of self of the
person. Having a conception of the self for each person
is an important condition of living a flourishing life.
Sangiovanni offers an interesting conception of the self:
26. See Hellman, above n. 4.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Sangiovanni, above n. 3, at 133.
30. G.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Engl. transl. by A.V. Miller
(1977), at 111.
31. J. Rawls, Theory of Justice (1971), at 139.
one that associates it with a person’s values and norma-
tive commitments that are central to one’s life.32
This harm is accentuated by the material harm that a
person expresses when she is being discriminated
against. A person refused a good or a service that she
needs also has to make a greater effort in order to obtain
that good or service. A person who is refused a cake to
celebrate his or her same-sex marriage with another per-
son needs to spend more time and energy in identifying
a baker that is able to produce the cake that she needs.
This material harm intensifies the psychological harm
that the person experiences.
Discrimination causes another type of harm that can be
described as existential. The existential harm that a per-
son experiences relates to her facing additional obstacles
in front of her when she is trying to transcend her
circumstances and define her identity. Humanity is
involved in an effort to transcend her circumstances in
any attempt to make sense of the world. The search for
meaning in life is a characteristic of every human being.
This existential possibility in human life has been asso-
ciated by some scholars with the idea of human digni-
ty.33 In this effort to transcend their circumstances,
some persons are facing more obstacles than others,
which are the result of social constructs, prejudice and
stereotypes. Discrimination on the basis of age, race,
gender, sexual orientation, religion and disability creates
additional obstacles to the persons that experience it,
which should not be there. The persons who are experi-
encing discrimination on the basis of all these criteria
are therefore entitled to additional protection. It is legit-
imate for the state to engage in action eliminating discri-
mination out of respect for human dignity. Respecting
human dignity means treating human beings as having
unconditional value. It means, to use Kant’s famous
phrase, treating human beings as ends and not as
means.34 Persons who experience discrimination are
denied the unconditional respect that should be recog-
nised to them simply because they are human beings.
This constitutes a deontological foundation for the right
not to be discriminated against.
Harm is in these cases both material and immaterial.
The evaluation of a stereotype or a prejudice relates to
attributing social meaning and consequences to the acts
of social actors.35 It focuses on the wider social, cultural
and historical contexts in which their acts operate and
possibly accentuate.36 Anti-discrimination law aims to
tackle a social environment that is demeaning. To
demean someone has a social and a power dimension.
This operation of trying to bring about social change by
changing collective states of mind implies challenges for
liberalism to the extent that it implies evaluating social
32. Sangiovanni, above n. 3, at 79.
33. See G. Kateb, Human Dignity, (2011) at 10.
34. I. Kant, Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, Engl. transl. by
James W. Ellington (1993), at 45.
35. On focusing on the social meaning of an act as expressing moral inferi-
ority in order to define when discrimination is wrong, see Sangiovanni,
above n. 3, at 122.
36. See Hellman, above n. 4.
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harm. Changing how human beings think requires an
additional justification to the extent that state paternal-
ism is itself demeaning as it means treating citizens as
immature human beings. The danger of sliding into
illiberalism is present in all these cases. The analysis in
part 3 engages with these difficulties.
In all these cases of immaterial and material harm,
discrimination perpetuates a social context of oppression
and marginalisation that threatens peaceful coexistence.
This necessitates taking action towards eliminating
discrimination. If this is the harm that a person experi-
ences when she is facing discrimination, it is legitimate
for the state to try to eliminate prejudice. It is also legiti-
mate for it to try to change the behaviour of those whose
acts have an impact on others. Legislation against discri-
mination in the access to employment and goods and
services aims to address these cases of injustice towards
persons. It aims to eliminate a broader context of
oppression and marginalisation that some persons have
experienced. This broader context is actualised in every
denial to them of a job opportunity or of basic goods and
services that they need in order to survive. In these
cases, there is concrete material harm to the persons
who have experienced discrimination. There is also a
form of immaterial harm that exists when within a
society ideas circulate that are demeaning. Both these
types of harm threaten social interaction and peaceful
coexistence. Courts in many parts of the world may be
reluctant to expand their understanding of harm in a
way that includes all the types of harm just analysed.
This means that it is preferable for the state to engage in
soft paternalism that prevents them from occurring in
the first place. Scholars have made suggestions, dis-
cussed in part 4, as to how courts should elaborate tech-
niques that take prejudice into consideration in their
application of anti-discrimination law. These sugges-
tions concern the evaluation of the motivation in the
application of anti-discrimination law and legal tools to
confront systemic discrimination. The difficulties that
courts have in taking them into consideration mean that
it is preferable for the state to engage in preventive
action. It is legitimate to attempt to modify at least how
others manifest these beliefs through concrete acts. The
hope always exists that, in the long term, by modifying
their behaviour, persons carrying prejudices might be
led to doubt also their beliefs and filter their prejudices.
3 Is It Possible to Change
Hearts and Minds?
Before discussing whether, as a matter of principle, it is
possible to make a case in favour of soft paternalism, it is
worth reflecting whether it is possible to change hearts
and minds. Research in the areas of behavioural psy-
chology, neuroscience and social psychology indicates
that it is possible to bring about a change in hearts and
minds. Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of
the person of a minority group can lead to empathetic
understanding of her situation. Activating empathetic
understanding can lead a person to critically evaluate
her prejudice. The use of arguments that address both
the reason and the emotions of the person can help her
realise some of the prejudices she is carrying. It can also
help her eliminate them. This indicates that soft pater-
nalism is justified on a consequentialist basis.
Gordon Allport noted that interpersonal contact
between majority and minority groups can reduce prej-
udice.37 Allport noted the importance of institutional
support and the importance of creating a perception of
common interests and common humanity. Develop-
mental psycholgists note that prejudice is under envi-
ronmental control and might be shaped via educational,
social and legal policies.38 Research in the area of behav-
ioural psychology has also shown that intergroup preju-
dice can be reduced.39 Moral judgment is not a single
act that occurs in a person’s mind, but an ongoing pro-
cess affected by reasons and arguments.40 Prejudice,
intuition, reasoning and social influences interact to
produce moral judgment. This means that creating a
culture that fosters a more balanced, reflective and fair-
minded style of judgment can help people evaluate their
intuitions and prejudices.41 Attitudes can change when
individuals engage in active processing of brief messag-
es. Interventions encouraging active consideration of
counter-prejudicial thoughts can produce changes in
attitudes towards out-groups. A thought process
encouraging perspective taking, that is ‘imagining the
world from another’s vantage point’ has been shown to
reduce prejudice. As analysed earlier, prejudice consists
in categorising and in engaging in ‘in-group’ and ‘out-
group’ thinking. It was proved that encouraging indi-
viduals to actively take an out-group’s perspective can
durably reduce prejudice. During an experiment
conducted in Florida, participants were encouraged to
adopt ‘analogic perspective-taking’.42 This involved
encouraging participants to see how their own experi-
ence offered a perspective into minority groups’ experi-
ences, in this case transgender people. The experiment
included short interaction with persons identifying as
members of this group. It ended by asking voters to
describe if and how the exercise had changed their
minds. The intervention was described as being success-
ful in increasing acceptance of transgender people. The
experiment found that the change in attitudes was both
lasting and politically relevant. The findings are highly
37. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 261. See also Anita Böcker,
“Can Non-discrimination Law Change Hearts and Minds?, in this issue,
3.5.
38. R.S. Bigler et al., ‘Developmental Intergroup Theory: Explaining and
Reducing Children’s Social Stereotyping and Prejudice’, 162.
39. D. Broockman and J. Kalla, ‘Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field
Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing’, 352 Science, Issue 6282 220
(2016).
40. J. Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment’, above n. 20, at 828-9.
41. Ibid, at 829.
42. D. Broockman and J. Kalla, ‘Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field
Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing’, above n. 39 at 221.
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significant as they seem incompatible with theories that
depict prejudiced attitudes as durable and resistant to
change.
As analysed earlier, research in the area of neuroscience
shows that our brains form in-group and out-group
dichotomies with stunning speed.43 But research in the
same area has also shown that the roots of human mor-
ality are older than cultural institutions and con-
structs.44 Narratives related to protected values provoke
a strong emotional reaction.45 Commitment to norma-
tive principles is associated with certain feelings caused
by social emotions such as outrage and disgust. Emo-
tional brain systems are involved in moral cognition. In
general, interpreting stories in terms of protected prin-
ciple-based values is associated with increased signal in
the same brain regions activated by these kinds of moral
judgments and social emotions.46 Furthermore, research
has shown that the brain’s systems for emotion appear
to be engaged when protecting the aspects of our mental
lives with which we strongly identify.47 These include
our closely held beliefs, both political and religious.48
The same research shows that it is possible to change
both religious and political beliefs. If emotions play such
an important role in human thinking, then any attempt
by the state to coerce in this area does not necessarily
guarantee that change will follow. Only persuasive
mechanisms are likely to be successful.
Other studies in the area of social psychology have
shown that it is possible to eliminate group blame for
acts committed by persons associated with them and
thus to eliminate prejudice. A study conducted in the
US related to anti-Muslim hostility following attacks by
Muslims showed that by pointing out inconsistencies
and hypocrisy, it is possible to change hearts and
minds.49 Academics conducted an experiment by show-
ing videos that exposed the unfairness of collective
blame and challenged the perception of homogeneity
about persons seen as members of social groups that
have experienced discrimination. The experiment con-
cerned Muslims in an attempt to eliminate prejudice in
favour of extremist behaviour. When participants were
shown films highlighting hypocrisy in blaming one reli-
gious group, e.g. Muslims for extremism, and no other
43. Sapolsky, above n. 11.
44. Ibid., at 487, discussing the roots of justice in children and other pri-
mate animals.
45. J.T. Kaplan, S.I. Gimbel, M. Dehghani, M.H. Immordino-Yang, K.
Sagae, J.D. Wong, C.M. Tipper, H. Damasio, A.S. Gordon & A. Dama-
sio, ‘Processing Narratives Concerning Protected Values: A Cross-
Cultural Investigation of Neural Correlates’, 27 Cerebral Cortex
1428-1438 (February 2017).
46. Ibid., at 1434.
47. J.T. Kaplan, S.I. Gimbel & S. Harris, ‘Neural Correlates of Maintaining
One’s Political Beliefs in the Face of Counterevidence’, Scientific
Reports, 23 December 2016, www.nature.com/articles/srep39589.
48. S. Harris, J.T. Kaplan, A. Curiel, S.Y. Bookheimer, M. Iacoboni, M.S.
Cohen, ‘The Neural Correlates of Religious and Nonreligious Belief’,
4(10) PLoS ONE (2009).
49. E. Bruneau, N. Kteily & E. Falk, ‘Interventions Highlighting Hypocrisy
Reduce Collective Blame of Muslims for Individual Acts of Violence and
Assuage Anti-Muslim Hostility’, Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin, http://pcnlab.asc.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
CB_R1_accepted_10-10-17.pdf (last visited 10 October 2017).
religious groups, e.g. Christians for extremism, attitudes
did change. Challenging the perception of Muslim
homogeneity by providing counter-stereotypical exam-
ples can erode collective blame too.50 Watching a film
where Muslims are allowed to speak for themselves
allowed perspective taking, which is held to improve
intergroup attitudes and foster prosocial behaviour.
Another film provided social proof depicting examples
of Americans espousing pro-Muslim behaviours; e.g. an
interview with a man participating in demonstrations
against Islam recounting the transformation he experi-
enced after accepting an invitation from the imam of a
mosque to observe a service. And two more films chal-
lenged common beliefs about Muslims, for instance that
they hate America and that Muslim immigrants strain
the economy by citing data countering these views.
Some more films challenged the perception that Mus-
lims are intrinsically supportive of violence. This would
reduce the tendency to blame all Muslims for the vio-
lent actions of individual group members. Watching the
films did change attitudes towards Muslims in all these
cases. Longitudinal studies in the same area allowed
testing temporal relationships with more confidence.51
These studies revealed that prejudice and social exclu-
sion can be reduced with schooling interventions that
affect intergroup structures.
These experiments seem to affirm Adam Smith’s
insightful description of the operation of sympathy in
his Theory of Moral Sentiments.52 For Smith sympathy is
a faculty of the mind that allows a human being to pro-
ject herself through the use of her imagination into the
situation of another human being. For Smith, it is the
faculty of sympathy that allows morality. The experi-
ments just described seem to provide empirical valida-
tion to Smith’s moral theory. The faculty to sympathise
seems to have been activated by them. This means that
opinions and even prejudice can change through the
proper activation of sympathetic understanding. Con-
temporary psychologists and neuroscientists use the
term ‘empathy’ with the meaning that Smith attributed
to sympathy.53 Empathy has a cognitive element. It
means understanding the cause of someone’s pain. It
also means taking his perspective, ‘walking in his shoes’.
Research in neuroscience has shown that human beings
are affected by emotional contagion.54 It has also shown
that it can feel good to do good.55 But for a human being
to actually engage in action he or she needs appropriate
education towards helping others. This does not neces-
sarily occur automatically.56 Behaviours do not become
50. Ibid., at 12.
51. Anja Eller, Dominic Abrams and Miriam Koschate, “Can stateways
change folkways? Longitudinal tests of the interactive effects of inter-
group contact and categorization on prejudice”, 72 Journal of Experi-
mental Social Psychology, 21 (2017).
52. London [1853].
53. For psychologists, see P. Bloom, Against Empathy, The Case for Ration-
al Compassion (2018). For neuroscientists, see Sapolsky, above n. 11,
at 522.
54. Sapolsky, above n. 11, at 524.
55. Ibid., at 546.
56. Ibid., at 552.
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automatic unless a person is trained in them. The three
experiments cited earlier in this part confirm this analy-
sis. A person needs to be exposed to the situation of
another who is carrying the characteristic associated
with negative qualities. Exposure can lead to under-
standing someone else’s situation.
If this is the case, then it is legitimate for the state to
engage in action that activates sympathetic understand-
ing in human beings. This can be done through semi-
nars raising awareness about minority social groups.
This is not the case of mobilisation of emotions that can
lead to partiality feared by Kant. Scholars keep articu-
lating the same concerns, warning against over-reliance
on emotions in the formation of moral judgment.57 It is
the kind of emotion mobilisation that can help a person
reflect better on the application of Kant’s universalisa-
bility rule. Understanding the situation of a person who
experiences discrimination through emotional projec-
tion, i.e. a transgender person who wants to get married,
can help a person improve her ability to perceive the
conditions of the universalisability test. It can help her
understand that a right to marriage should be recog-
nised for everyone. Interpersonal communication that
leads to emotional projection in someone else’s situation
can help a person better understand the conditions that
can lead her reflection on what rights people should
have. If in-group and out-group mentality leads to prej-
udice and discrimination,58 experiments like the ones
analysed previously show that it is possible to expose a
person to circumstances that can lead her to fair reason-
ing towards out-groups. Empathy can be stimulated in a
way that, in coordination with reason, can lead to better
judgments about correct moral reasoning about rights.
If it is legitimate for the state to eliminate social power
dynamics that lead to discrimination, it is important to
distinguish between appropriate and non-appropriate
avenues the state could pursue in order to eliminate
prejudice. Policies towards eliminating prejudice should
address the rational and the emotional faculties of a per-
son. They should aim at using methods and techniques
that focus on persuasion and reduce coercion. They
should aim at encouraging citizens to use their critical
abilities. If discrimination occurs owing to unconscious
patterns of thinking, it is very important to elaborate
sophisticated tools to address them as well.
Scholarship on ‘nudging’ has highlighted the choice
architecture that affects the decisions persons make.59
The term is crafted to mean the possibilities available to
individuals in their decision-making in various areas
that concern their life and their health. The factors that
define this architecture are omnipresent even if people
cannot see them. Numerous structures define our deci-
sions. Nature, customs and traditions and spontaneous
57. For a re-articulation of these concerns by a psychologist, see Bloom,
above n. 53.
58. Bloom, above n. 53, at 90, reaffirms this point.
59. C. Sunstein, Why Nudge?, The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism
(2014), at 14-15, A. Kemmerer, C. Möllers, M. Steinbeis & G. Wagner
(eds.), Choice Architecture in Democracies, Exploring the Legitimacy of
Nudging (2016).
and non-spontaneous orders.60 Adopting Foucault’s
perspective, we can say that all sorts of social power that
are exercised upon us, consciously and unconsciously,
provide a choice architecture. This includes private and
public power. These visible and invisible structures that
affect decision-making can be properly tuned by the
state in order to eliminate prejudice that is conscious
and unconscious. Creating this kind of architecture can
be dictated on the basis of a soft paternalism towards
eliminating prejudice before it materialises in action. In
the area of discrimination where there is harm to others
that is subtle and often immaterial, it is legitimate for
the state to engage in preventive action towards chang-
ing hearts and minds. If prejudice is unconscious and
often the result of social power that is invisible, then it is
legitimate for the state to eliminate these social power
dynamics. In other words, the state should opt towards
the social structures that minimise the impact of preju-
dice that leads to discrimination. Governments, by
highlighting some topics and downplaying others, can
have a significant impact on the operation of prejudice.
They can have an important role in mobilising sympa-
thetic understanding that can help to eliminate preju-
dice. A society that wants to become well ordered can-
not remain indifferent to social oppression. On the con-
trary, it should always be alert to discovering new ways
according to which social power operates. Nudging
should aim to raise awareness about how discrimination
works in order to encourage persons to critically evalu-
ate their prejudices.
The most compelling objection to nudging is the risk of
manipulation. Manipulation consists in an attempt to
reduce the use of the rational faculties of a person in
order to lead them to a decision that benefits the manip-
ulator to the detriment of the interests of the person
who is manipulated. An effort to make every citizen
realise that every person is worthy of equal uncondition-
al respect can hardly be considered manipulating. An
effort to persuade citizens that they should give a chance
to every other fellow citizen to show to them who they
are beyond any kind of prejudice can be seen as an effort
to ensure informed choice in various areas of human
action. Nudging with the aim of eliminating discrimi-
nation aims to encourage more discussion and participa-
tion in the political system.61 As Cass Sunstein notes,
nudging exists de facto in all social contexts. Choice
architecture exists by default. Governments always
nudge. As Polanyi has famously written, ‘the free mar-
ket was planned, planning was not.’ To paraphrase Pola-
nyi, nudging always existed. It is important that the
government practices nudging in a way that respects the
dignity of all social members. In the case of discrimi-
nation where there is material and immaterial harm to
60. C.R. Sunstein, ‘The Ethics of Choice Architecture’, in A. Kemmerer, C.
Möllers, M. Steinbeis & G. Wagner (eds.), Choice Architecture in
Democracies, Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging (2016) 21.
61. Cf. C. McCrudden and J. King, ‘The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics,
Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism’, in A. Kemmerer,
C. Möllers, M. Steinbeis & G. Wagner (eds.), Choice Architecture in
Democracies, Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging (2016) 113.
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others, nudging can only prevent awkward situations
within civil society that threaten peaceful coexistence. It
is thus compelling for the state to discover appropriate
ways of ‘nudging’ towards reducing the risk of discrimi-
natory behaviour. Nudges that point towards integrat-
ing harmoniously social members are democratic. They
can be seen as ensuring equal respect that facilitates
democratic participation for all members. And they can
also be justified in reference to the concept of autonomy
and dignity. They aim to ensure those principles for all.
It is acceptable for the state to engage in action towards
making citizens conscious of how discrimination oper-
ates. Increasing consciousness about what discrimi-
nation is and how it works can help citizens become
more perceptive. It can encourage them to filter their
prejudices in order to reduce the role of unconscious
factors within decision-making. There are a number of
measures that states can take. Civic education lessons
offered during primary and secondary education are
excellent methods towards changing hearts and minds
early on. Classes teaching tolerance and equality for all
are exercising a legitimate soft paternalism. Civic educa-
tion can foster deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy.62 In this respect, civic education can play a
significant role in making students alert about how
social power works, according to Foucault’s perspective.
Civic education should aim to encourage citizens that
social power is omnipresent. We should be alert to the
likelihood that we may be oppressing fellow citizens on
the basis of the characteristic that they have. Civic edu-
cation should encourage individual and social alertness
towards raising awareness about potential sources of
social power upon minority groups. They are the ideal
laboratories of stimulating sympathetic understanding
provided that they can allow free and uninhibited dis-
cussion of pressing social issues. Equal respect of all
participants in every discussion is very important to
eliminate prejudice through the use of argument. Civic
education should teach tolerance and respect for differ-
ence, by allowing the respectful discussion of all
opinions. Allowing students to express themselves in
schools so that they feel that they are influencing ‘the
climate and policies of their school’ helps them develop
into ‘more effective, skilled, and knowledgeable citi-
zens’. These lessons can also be combined with in-class
and out-of-class experience, where students may engage
in community service as well as ‘academic study of the
issues addressed by the students’ service where students
might discuss underlying causes of social problems’.63
These lessons should be obligatory despite objections
raised in some context in reference to religious beliefs.64
62. See J.E. Fleming and L.C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsi-
bilities and Virtues (2013), at 118.
63. Peter Levine and Kei Kawashima-Ginsberg, 4.
64. In the city of Birmingham, in the UK, objections were raised to civics
education teaching tolerance towards homosexuality by parents on the
basis of their religious beliefs. The relevant protests led to court ruling in
favour of exclusion zones; see ‘LGBT Teaching Row: Birmingham Pri-
mary School Protests Permanently Banned’, The Guardian, 26
November, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-50557227.
When families neglect or do not provide civic education
to their children, schools should step into this role.65 In
fact, the bringing together of young people with differ-
ent backgrounds itself ensures first-hand experience and
interaction with various cultures that can operate
towards eliminating prejudice.
Prefigurative politics can also be deployed in this direc-
tion. The state can provide the means to NGOs that are
active in defending the rights of persons who have expe-
rienced discrimination to create short films and radio
spots that can eliminate stereotypes. It can also mobilise
public media to diffuse them. For instance, NGOs
active in the area of protecting persons with disabilities
would have valuable expertise to create short films indi-
cating the special abilities these persons have. The state
should subsidise them so that they engage in publicity
efforts to raise awareness on these abilities. A short vid-
eo clip describing the different abilities of a person con-
sidered ‘disabled’ can lead to an understanding of her
situation and to changing stereotypes associated with
‘disability’. This clip can be projected during advertis-
ing time by public broadcasting media. It can also be
projected onto screens while queuing to receive public
services, in public hospitals’ waiting rooms, etc. A clip
like this one can serve the role of well-intentioned
‘nudging’ of persons towards adopting the perspective
of those considered ‘disabled’.
Broad solutions that encourage collaborations across
social groups can operate towards eliminating prejudice.
The state needs to engage in wide policies of accultura-
tion using various media to achieve its goals. It needs to
encourage the citizens to transcend their perspective
and to challenge their point of view. It needs to encour-
age them to adopt the perspective of those who have
experienced discrimination and sympathise with them.
As Martha Minow has noted, recognising that we are all
different is what is needed to break the cycle of discri-
mination.66 Reflecting critically on the stereotypes and
categories that our own thought needs is very important
in this respect. Seminars informing about how prejudice
works in the workplace and elsewhere are a type of
measure that can help. It is legitimate for the state to
require private employers to provide similar training to
all employees related to how prejudice works in
interpersonal decision-making processes.
The enforcement of antidiscrimination law can thus
appear legitimate. Gordon Allport noted in one of the
editions of his major work on Prejudice that most citi-
zens would accept “a firmly enforced executive order”
…”as a fait accompli, with little protest or disorder. In
part they do so because integrationist policies are usual-
ly in line with their own consciences (even though coun-
tering their prejudices)”.67 There are some concerns in
the enforcement of anti-discrimination law that relate to
social cohesion. Enforcing anti-discrimination law can
65. Fleming and McClain, above n. 48, at 120-121.
66. M. Minow, ‘Making All the Difference: Three Lessons in Equality, Neu-
trality, and Tolerance’, 39 DePaul Law Review 1-13 (1989-1990).
67. Gordon Allport, Foreword to the 1958 edition of The Nature of Preju-
dice, above n. 6.
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lead to animosity between social groups that threatens
peaceful coexistence. Scholars in the US have expressed
this concern as the risk of ‘balkanisation’.68 On the basis
of this approach, anti-discrimination law should be
enforced with caution in order not to lead to the break-
up of social bonds. According to what are held to be
neo-conservative arguments, anti-discrimination law
should not be enforced because it perpetuates animosity
between social groups. Justice Scalia, in his concurring
opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano, articulated the idea that
anti-discrimination law places ‘a racial thumb on the
scales… requiring employers to evaluate the racial out-
comes of their policies and to make decisions based on
those racial outcomes’, a type of decision-making that is
discriminatory.69 It is definitely preferable for the state
to engage in nudging in order to prevent discrimination.
Nevertheless, there are cases where besides nudging,
anti-discrimination law should be enforced too when
discrimination actually occurs. As empirical evidence
has shown, the most effective means of changing behav-
iour in a population is to use a range of policy tools, reg-
ulatory and not.70
4 Is It Legitimate for the State
to Intervene in Changing
Hearts and Minds?
As analysed earlier, when discrimination results in con-
crete material harm, it is easier to make a case in favour
of government intervention. In the area of thoughts and
beliefs it is harder. Changing how human beings think
requires an additional justification to the extent that
state paternalism is itself demeaning as it means treating
citizens as immature human beings. The risk of sliding
into illiberalism is present. A good justification towards
accepting government intervention is the risk of preju-
dice materialising in harm towards the individual. If
prejudice is cognitive and thus unconscious, it is very
important for the state to raise awareness in order to
eliminate its negative unintended consequences. It is
legitimate for the state to engage in action towards elim-
inating both aspects of prejudice, the rational and the
emotional. If prejudice has both a rational and an irra-
tional component, it is impossible to eliminate it by state
coercion. Force cannot remove prejudice, ‘make way for
Truth, remove one Truth for another’, Locke notes.71
Only methods that address both the rational and the
emotional faculties, and possibly even ‘nudging’ (done
68. R. Siegel, ‘From Colorblindness to Anti-Balkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases’, 120 The Yale Law Journal
1278 (2011).
69. Ricci v. DeStefano, at 557 U.S. 557, at 594.
70. See House of Lords, Science and Technology Select Committee behav-
iour Change Report (2011) HR Paper 179, 5.13, cited in McCrudden
and King, above n. 61, at 92.
71. “Excerpts from a Third Letter for Toleration”, in M. Goldie (ed.), A Let-
ter concerning Toleration and Other Writings (2010) 78.
properly and in a way that respects liberty) can contrib-
ute towards changing attitudes. Educational methods
broadly conceived can contribute towards preventing
behaviours and legal enforcement should intervene
when it is necessary to restore harm.
Liberals agree that when harm to others is at stake, then
it is legitimate for the state to intervene. Mill has articu-
lated the harm principle that liberals hold as the canon
for government intervention within civil society.72
According to this principle, the government may limit
someone’s liberty against his will only to prevent harm
to others.73 A person’s own good ‘is not a sufficient war-
rant’, Mill thinks, ‘for which power can be exercised
over him’.74 People are amenable to society, he consid-
ers, only for conduct that concerns others.75 Mill makes
a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding
acts. If we consider that our consciousness is social and
defined in social interaction we realise that this distinc-
tion is artificial. Nevertheless, Mill still provides impor-
tant insights into the meaning and purpose of the force
that it is legitimate for the state to use. Only when con-
crete, material harm to others is caused, is it legitimate
for the government to intervene. In the area of prejudice
that leads to discriminatory behaviour, it is not legiti-
mate for the state to intervene in order to change how
citizens think because this is wrong in itself. It is only
legitimate for the government to intervene in order to
make sure that these thoughts do not materialise in
actions that harm others.
Liberals underline the importance of the autonomy of
the person. The state behaves paternalistically when it
attempts to change the way a person thinks out of a con-
cern for the well-being of that person. Kant has also
noted that paternalism is ‘the greatest conceivable des-
potism’ because it treats human beings as immature
beings and as unable to define happiness for them-
selves.76 It is possible to distinguish between ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ paternalism.77 According to Feinberg’s definitions
of the distinction, hard paternalists accept that it is nec-
essary to protect competent adults against their will
from the harmful consequences of their fully voluntary
choices and undertakings. Soft paternalists accept that
the state has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful
conduct only when it is substantially involuntary or
when temporary intervention is necessary to establish
whether it is voluntary or not.78 The state’s concern in
this area is to help implement a person’s ‘real’ choice.
Soft paternalists generally argue that intervention is
legitimate for generally competent people when factors
that reduce voluntariness affect the decisions of a per-
72. Above n. 1.
73. J. Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’, in J. Gray (ed.), On Liberty and Other
Essays, (1998) at 14.
74. Ibid., at 14.
75. Ibid.
76. I. Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, But It
Does Not Apply in Practice’, in H. Reiss (ed.), Political Writings, Engl.
transl. by H.B. Nisbet (1970), at 74.
77. J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 3, Harm to Self
(1989), at 12.
78. Ibid.
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son.79 This is the case, for instance, for people who are
prone to the influence of distorting emotions. More
generally, it is legitimate for the state to correct lack of
information for those who chose not to gather it. An
intervention may be autonomy-respecting when the tar-
get would consent to it if she were informed. Voluntari-
ness can be a matter of degree.80 Given this account,
questions arise as to whether soft paternalism is an inde-
pendent liberty-limiting principle at all.81 Soft paternal-
ism aims to protect a person from his/her nonvoluntary
choices. For Feinberg, soft paternalism is not paternal-
ism at all.82 Rather, it should be seen as consistent with
liberalism. If it increases awareness, it increases free-
dom. Feinberg thinks that the definition of liberalism
should be enlarged so that soft paternalism becomes a
morally valid liberty-limiting principle.
Arguably, this is relevant to prejudice. What is at stake
in prejudice is unconscious behaviour. If prejudice is
likely to materialise in behaviour that causes serious
harm, then it is possible to make a case in favour of state
action in order to raise consciousness in the citizens
about its existence. Once a person becomes aware of her
prejudices and that those are unjustified, it is very likely
that she will voluntarily modify her behaviour. Govern-
ment intervention is respecting autonomy when it has
the form of raising awareness. It is plausible that gov-
ernment is protecting the person from decisions and
harm that is ‘other’ from himself or herself. There
should be a threshold of harm that justifies a liberal gov-
ernment’s interest in changing citizens’ opinions for
self-regarding acts, even when the suspicion exists that
non-voluntary behaviour is at stake. This threshold
should be defined in reference to the social harm that is
caused, which means that the act is no longer self-
regarding. The costs of retrieving or repairing harm
weigh heavily upon society. The line between self-
regarding and other regarding acts should be traced by
defining what is remotely or trivially other-regarding.83
Triviality in this case is also defined in reference to the
extent of the population that shares discriminatory prej-
udice. If it is shared by a good number of them, then it
can certainly approach the threshold of serious harm. If
more than fifty percent carry the prejudice, then social
coexistence is seriously threatened.84
In the area of discriminatory prejudice, the distinction
between self-regarding and other-regarding is fluid.
Furthermore, the risk of direct harm to others also
exists. Prejudice can materialise in discrimination in
many areas of social life. Widespread prejudice can be
destructive to the existence of society. As discussed
earlier, soft paternalism can be justified in order to
79. J. Feinberg, ‘Legal Paternalism’, 16 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
105-124 (1971), J. Hanna, ‘Hard and Soft Paternalism’, in K. Grill and J.
Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternal-
ism (2018) 28-29.
80. Feinberg (1971), above n. 79, at 111.
81. Feinberg (1989), above n. 77, at 12.
82. Ibid., at 14-16.
83. Feinberg (1989), above n. 77, at 22.
84. This thought is inspired by Joel Feinberg’s discussion of similar issues in
Harm to Self, 23.
ensure that behaviour prima facie self-regarding does
not end up in behaviour that threatens social
coexistence. The line between self-regarding and other
regarding acts should be traced by defining what is trivi-
ally other-regarding.85 Triviality should be defined with
reference to the extent of the population that shares the
discriminatory prejudice. Widespread prejudice can
affect social interaction and cooperation. Prejudice can
encourage a feeling of malaise and stir animosity
between social groups. It can lead to long judicial pro-
cesses before courts. It can burden taxpayers with
unnecessary costs to support this system. The social
costs of repairing harm can become important. This
means that preventive action can be encouraged in this
case. If prejudice operates in unconscious ways, it is
legitimate for the government to raise consciousness
about what prejudice is and how it works. If, as analysed
earlier, discriminatory behaviour is cognitive, it is legiti-
mate for the state to engage in action that helps human
beings realise how they form and modify their cognitive
categories.
When concrete harm to the rights of others is at stake,
then paternalism is not relevant. What is at stake is pro-
tecting others from harm. Soft paternalism makes sense
only in order to change opinions towards preventing
harm to others’ rights. There is a wide spectrum of tools
that are available to the state in order to handle cases of
discrimination. Anti-discrimination law has emerged as
an area of law because consciousness emerged that there
are some behavioural patterns that introduce obstacles
to social cohesion and social interaction. Human beings
make decisions on the basis of some criteria like age,
race, gender, sexual orientation, religion and disability,
which affect others. They exclude them from having
access to employment or to goods and services. Employ-
ment decisions on the basis of some of these criteria lim-
it employment opportunities for part of the population.
These decisions cause harm to the extent that they mean
that these persons face additional obstacles in their lives
in having what they need in order to survive. Providers
of goods and services exclude persons from having
access to them on the basis of the same criteria.
Any government intervention in this respect should be
done with great caution and in a way that enhances the
freedom of the citizens. Freedom of thought is a funda-
mental freedom. Government intervention in how citi-
zens think and feel cannot be justified. It is also doubtful
whether it can be effective. Eccentric and provocative
beliefs should be tolerated out of respect for individual
freedom. Locke’s writings on toleration can be instruc-
tive in this area.86 He noted that government attempts to
affect beliefs are vain. Human beings cannot conform
their beliefs to the dictates of another. Beliefs are a mat-
85. Feinberg (1989), above n. 77, at 22.
86. See his ‘Letter Concerning Toleration’, in M. Goldie (ed.), A Letter Con-
cerning Toleration and Other Writings (2010) and his ‘Excerpts from a
Third Letter for Toleration’, in M. Goldie (ed.), A Letter Concerning Tol-
eration and Other Writings (2010).
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ter of the ‘inward and full persuasion of the mind’.87
The care of each person’s heart and mind belongs only
to himself or herself. The power of civil authorities con-
sists only in outward force. The nature of human under-
standing is such that it cannot be compelled to the belief
of anything by outward force. Penalties are not effective
in changing hearts and minds. Only persuasion can do
so. ‘Only Light and Evidence can work a change in
Mens Opinions,’ he notes (sic).88 Locke thinks that it
should be everyone’s moral duty to make use of argu-
ments in order to persuade others to be virtuous.89 Gov-
ernment intervention should be accepted also in these
terms, but only to the extent that it enhances the free-
dom of the citizens by raising awareness that allows
them to make free, well-informed decisions. Locke also
accepts that the magistrates, just like every other man in
the state, may make use of arguments in order to ‘teach,
instruct and redress the Erroneous by Reason’.90 This is
so because this respects the freedom of a person by max-
imising information that allows voluntary decision-mak-
ing. Raising awareness about how prejudice operates
should be done in a way that involves as little as possible
the punitive mechanism of the state. Only persuasion is
the legitimate means to change hearts and minds.
Locke also agrees that it may be legitimate for the state
to enforce virtuous behaviour not because it is virtuous
but because it ensures the preservation of society.91 And
he notes that the good of the commonwealth is the
standard of all human laws. Locke offers an interesting
rationale for government intervention. It is legitimate
for the state to enforce good behaviour, not because it is
good in itself, but because not doing so might threaten
the preservation of society. It is thus legitimate for the
government to intervene because harmful behaviour
threatens social interaction. If discriminatory prejudice
causes substantial social harm, then it is legitimate for
the state to intervene in order to eliminate it. If this
harm is the result of social power dynamics, then it is
legitimate for the state to engage in action towards
affecting these dynamics. The state should engage in
action that eliminates social power imbalances. From a
liberal perspective, this does not mean that the state
promotes a perfectionistic goal aiming to make citizens
virtuous. Ideally, it should strive to create a situation
where persons are not denied opportunities for charac-
teristics that are projected upon them arbitrarily. Soft
paternalism is legitimate to the extent that it addresses a
person’s reason and emotions towards eliminating prej-
udice. If prejudice is a preliminary judgment that
invades consciousness and prevents a person from see-
ing things otherwise, it is legitimate for the state to do
its best in order to raise awareness about its existence.
87. ‘Letter Concerning Toleration’, in M. Goldie (ed.), A Letter Concerning
Toleration and Other Writings (2010) 39.
88. Ibid., at 40.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. ‘Excerpts from a Third Letter for Toleration’, in M. Goldie (ed.), A Letter
Concerning Toleration and Other Writings (2010) 95.
There are some values that are fundamental to a well-
ordered society. The principle of equal respect for
everyone is one of these values. Others include equal
liberty, fair equality of opportunity and the social basis
of mutual respect among citizens. Eliminating discrimi-
natory prejudice serves as the social basis of mutual
respect. Rawls’s thought is very enlightening in this
respect. He thinks that there are some ideas that can
concentrate an overlapping consensus between compre-
hensive doctrines.92 Rawls has offered an interesting
analysis of a test that a rule should pass in order to be
accepted as a rule of a well-ordered society.93 He dis-
cusses the idea of a well-ordered society as a society
whose citizens all accept the same principles of justice,
whose political and social institutions satisfy these prin-
ciples, and whose citizens comply with these institutions
considering them as just.94 This publicly recognised
conception of justice establishes a shared point of view
from which citizens’ claims on society can be adjudica-
ted.95
In order to persuade for the validity of these rules Rawls
engages in the thought experiment of the original posi-
tion. He constructs the original position as a device
offering an abstraction of the contingencies of each per-
son in the social world.96 The social members under the
veil of ignorance have a rational capacity, that is, they
can have a conception first of their own good, and, sec-
ond, a reasonable capacity, that is, they can have a
capacity for a sense of justice, which means that they
accept the validity of rules that regulate interaction.
This thought experiment aims to enlighten norms of
fair social cooperation. It is relevant in order to evaluate
prejudice. It is a helpful thought experiment that can
help us hypothesise what types of rules are just in the
absence of factors that lead us towards making partial
decisions. If we did not know the circumstances that
define our existence, that is whether we have a charac-
teristic that might lead others to discriminate against
ourselves, then we would want society to establish the
rules of fair social cooperation. We would want our
society to be organised in a way that meets the needs of
all participants. Under a veil of ignorance everyone
would want not to experience discrimination. This pro-
vides legitimacy for the enforcement of anti-discrimi-
nation law.
For Rawls, these principles are political principles, not
metaphysical – that is, they are principles that can be
agreed upon independently of the comprehensive reli-
gious, philosophical and moral conceptions of each per-
son. A society based on fair cooperation is thus based on
the idea that there are some terms that each participant
may reasonably accept in a reciprocal way with every-
body else and that serve everybody’s good. Rawls con-
92. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (2005), at 39.
93. For an extended analysis, see I. Tourkochoriti, ‘Revisiting Hosanna-
Tabor: The Road Not Taken’, 49 Tulsa Law Review 45-96, at 88
(2013).
94. Rawls, above n. 92, at 35.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., at 16.
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tinues with the idea that questions about constitutional
essentials and matters of public justice are to be settled
by appeal to political values alone, with respect to which
political values have the weight to override all other val-
ues that may come into conflict with them. These
political values cannot be overridden as they govern ‘the
basic framework of social life’, which constitutes ‘the
very groundwork of our existence’, and ‘specify the fun-
damental terms of political and social cooperation’.
Rawls argues that about these values there can be an
overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines, even if these doctrines are in conflict. Or
better, they can win the support of every citizen by
addressing their reason, even if they adhere to conflict-
ing comprehensive doctrines. Agreement is possible in
circumstances of reasonable pluralism. Provided that all
citizens are willing to use their public reason, they will
agree on the fundamental role of some political values
expressing the terms of fair social cooperation consistent
with mutual respect of free and equal citizens. As Rawls
notes, ‘[A]ny realistic idea of a well-ordered society may
seem to imply that some such compromise is involved.’
Some of the ideas that people would agree upon in the
original position are ideas that can concentrate an over-
lapping consensus even in our contemporary pluralistic
societies. A well-ordered society is one that is governed
by a political conception of justice that is the result of an
overlapping consensus between opposing comprehen-
sive doctrines and where unreasonable comprehensive
doctrines do not gain enough currency to undermine
society’s essential justice.97 We can add to this reflection
the unreasonable elements within comprehensive doc-
trines, such as elements that some human beings, e.g.
homosexuals or persons with disabilities, should have
unequal rights to live a meaningful life. To extend
Rawls’ thought further, it seems that there can be an
overlapping consensus on the fact that everyone must
have access to the goods and services that they need. A
religious belief that expresses intolerance towards some
social members should not be tolerated. If we did not
know whether we are part of a social group that runs the
risk of experiencing discrimination in the access to
goods and services, we would want everyone to be
spared from having to experience it.
These Rawls-inspired reflections can promote our
thinking about the legitimacy of the state’s efforts to
raise awareness of discriminatory prejudice. It is legiti-
mate to engage in soft paternalism towards changing
hearts and minds in order to enable citizens to make
decisions that respect the equal dignity of all social
members. Under a veil of ignorance we would all want
not to experience discrimination. In the same hypotheti-
cal situation, were we to exercise our public reason we
would want vulnerable citizens to be protected by the
state against civil society actors that discriminate against
them. And it would be legitimate for the state to engage
in preventive action in this respect. The previous analy-
sis indicates that a version of soft paternalism in order to
97. Ibid., at 39.
eliminate prejudice is permissible on a deontological and
consequentialist basis. On a deontological basis it is
legitimate for the government to attempt to change
hearts and minds in order to protect human beings as
ends in themselves. It is also justified on a consequenti-
alist basis as in the long term it can have the best possi-
ble effects for individuals and societies.
5 Legal Tools
The previous section of this paper showed that there is a
philosophical justification behind recognizing positive
obligations for the state to engage in action that aims to
eliminate prejudice. Many international conventions
which establish these positive obligations reflect this
philosophical justification.98 Nudging and soft paternal-
ism need to go together with the enforcement of legal
rules forbidding discrimination in some instances. In
cases where a discriminatory decision cannot be preven-
ted, it is very important to use the law in order to
reverse its effects when harm to others exists. Law has
an expressive function too.99 Legislation against discri-
mination in the access to employment and to goods and
services sends a message. Discrimination on the forbid-
den grounds is wrongful. The analysis of types of harm
previously in this article shows that it can be both
material and immaterial. When it is immaterial it is dif-
ficult to justify government intervention for liberals.
Civil responsibility is, in any case, highly preferable to
criminal responsibility.
In the enforcement of anti-discrimination law Dur-
kheim’s insights are very relevant. Durkheim noted that
the predominance of criminal sanctions is characteristic
of societies of mechanical solidarity.100 Those societies
are not characterised by an advanced division of labour,
and thus a sense of complementarity among social
members that transforms the moral consciousness of
each individual has not emerged yet. Societies charac-
terised by mechanical solidarity need to ensure the alle-
giance of their members by enforcing the respect of
some deeply held values. Hence, the predominance of
criminal sanctions in their midst. For Durkheim, societ-
ies with sophisticated division of labour have succeeded
in creating a moral consciousness of complementarity.
This sense of complementarity holds their members
together. This means that social members do not need a
strong punitive mechanism to guarantee allegiance to
the community. When a member violates a rule, society
needs to restore the situation to the status quo ante. It
needs to turn back the clock to the situation that existed
98. For an analysis of these international legal tools see Stephanie E. Berry,
“A Positive State Obligation to Counter Dehumanisation under Inter-
national Human Rights Law”, in this issue.
99. See C.R. Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’, 144 University
of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021 (1996), R. Mullender, ‘Racial Harass-
ment, Sexual Harassment and the Expressive Function of Law’, 61
Modern Law Review 236 (1998).
100. D. Émile, The Division of Labor in Society, transl by L.A. Coser. (1984
[1893]).
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before the violation of the rule. Therefore, in the area of
enforcing anti-discrimination law it is important to
focus on legal sanctions that strengthen this sense of
complementarity and allegiance to the community. Civil
sanctions can achieve this goal better than criminal sanc-
tions. Criminal sanctions are a sign of harshness. They
are a sign of insecurity of a community. A community
punishes harshly because it feels threatened. Civil sanc-
tions are a sign that the community is merely restoring
the situation to the status quo ante and is willing to
move on.
In the area of employment discrimination, mechanisms
and solutions that reflect a conciliatory attitude are also
legitimate. Finding solutions that involve reasonable
accommodation is also necessary. The concept of rea-
sonable accommodation does not imply that the rights
of one party win over those of the other. On the contra-
ry, it points towards a spirit of finding a workable
solution that respects the rights of both employers and
employees. Finding a reasonable accommodation is very
relevant in the area of religious freedom and dress codes
and in the area of disability and age discrimination.
Enforcing anti-discrimination legislation in the access to
employment is fundamental towards eliminating discri-
mination and changing attitudes and hearts and minds.
If human beings have a natural tendency to prefer their
same and to project negative stereotypes onto those that
are different from them, then it is important to attempt
to eliminate this attitude. Offering employment oppor-
tunities to persons beyond stereotypes can allow them to
show who they truly are.
Another legal tool that can help in this direction is
enforcing anti-discrimination legislation in the access to
goods and services. A debate has emerged related to the
possibility of some citizens to put forward religious
objections in the application of legislation that outlaws
discrimination in the access to goods and services. The
debates relate to whether anti-discrimination law in the
access to goods should be enforced, for instance, upon
providers of cakes for the celebration of same sex mar-
riages.101 Locke’s objections emerge in this case anew.
Should persons be forced to fulfil a legal obligation if
their religious convictions dictate otherwise? If the point
of having anti-discrimination law is to bring about a
change in attitudes then it should be enforced even
upon objections of this kind. Civil Rights legislation in
the US eliminated race discrimination in the access to
goods and services because it obliged providers not to
discriminate on the basis of race.102 As our societies
evolve, we become more aware of different ways of exer-
cising social power and thus of discriminating. We real-
101. The debate relates to the recent rulings Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission in the US and138 S. Ct. 1719, 584
US __, 201 L. Ed. 2d 35 and Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018
UK SC 49] in the UK. The case in the UK did not concern a wedding per
se but the preparation of a cake expressing a message in favour of
same-sex marriage to be brought to a political event in favour of recog-
nising same-sex marriage.
102. For a relevant discussion see also Anita Böcker, Can Non-discrimination
Law Change Hearts and Minds?, in this issue, 3.2.
ised relatively recently that we need to eliminate discri-
mination on the basis of sexual orientation. The rights
of homosexual persons are gaining recognition, while
the rights of transgender persons are not recognised to
the same extent yet. It is very important for legislation
to take into consideration the need to protect the rights
of these new groups. Just like the government in the US
in the past had to enforce legislation against racial
discrimination in the access to goods and services, it
should now enforce it in order to protect other social
groups. Being part of a society means accepting the
enforcement of rules that operate in a way that elimi-
nates prejudice. In this case harm is more tangible. As
analysed earlier, it is both material and immaterial. The
social risk that the person with the protected character-
istic might not be able to obtain the goods and services
that she needs from another provider is too heavy to
take. There may be an undue burden upon the person
asking for the good in this case. A well-ordered society
needs to ensure that human beings have the goods that
they need in order to survive.
Depending on context, the enforcement of anti-discri-
mination law upon claims for religious exemptions can
take many forms. In South Africa, the High Court has
held that a church that refuses to ‘solemnise’ same-sex
marriage ‘inherently diminishes the dignity’ of persons
in same-sex relationships.103 A similar ruling would be
unthinkable in the US, where the doctrine of ministerial
exception under the First Amendment precludes gov-
ernment intervention in religious matters. The principle
of equality in the South African Constitution entirely
redefines the hierarchy of constitutional values. It leads
jurists to interpret the constitution as attributing secon-
dary importance to freedom of religion. In legal systems
that give priority to freedom of religion, such as that of
the US, a similar ruling would be unthinkable. In these
cases the appropriate criterion for tracing the line
between freedom of religion and anti-discrimination law
can be found in the degree of involvement in the same-
sex marriage ceremony. A church cannot be obliged to
‘solemnise’ a same-sex marriage. This would imply deep
involvement in the internal workings of the church. A
bakery that provides a cake should be asked to do so. A
conscientious objection should not be recognised here.
Such an objection should only be recognised to provid-
ers of services that are deeply involved in the ceremony,
such as oath writers.
Furthermore, scholars have made a number of sugges-
tions to address discriminatory behaviour based on ster-
eotype. If prejudice operates unconsciously, scholars
have argued that the non-discrimination principle must
evolve to encompass a prescriptive duty of care to iden-
tify and control for category-based judgment errors and
other forms of cognitive bias in intergroup settings.104
In the US, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff
can shift the burden of proof to the defendant by show-
ing simply that her group status ‘played a role’ in the
103. Gaum v. Van Rensburg, NO 2019 2All SA 722 (GP).
104. Krieger, above n. 7.
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decision or action taken against her.105 The plaintiff
would not have to prove that it was the sole reason, nor
would she have to establish that the reasons proffered by
the defendant were ‘cover-ups’ for a real discriminatory
reason.106 Commentators note that, unfortunately,
courts have not been very successful in their efforts to
define the respective spheres of application of the pre-
text and mixed-motives theories of liability.107 Courts
determine whether pretext or mixed-motives theory will
apply to a given case based on the type of evidence a
plaintiff proffers. Courts also disagree on the meaning of
‘direct evidence’ or ‘evidence directly tied to discrimi-
nation’. For these reasons Linda Hamilton Krieger sug-
gests that the pretext model of individual disparate
treatment proof should be replaced with a unitary moti-
vating factor analysis.108
Other scholars are in favour of a ‘negligence’ approach
to employment discrimination.109 Negligence is a theory
according to which there is breach of duty recognised by
law for the protection of others. This duty exists either
in the common law, in legislation or administrative reg-
ulation. Anti-discrimination law creates an obligation
for employers to treat employees without regard to race,
colour, religion, sexual orientation, disability, age or
national origin. According to this view, employers who
violate this obligation even without intending harm,
since prejudice is unconscious, should incur responsibil-
ity. When there is a duty to provide a reasonable accom-
modation, negligent discrimination exists when the
employer does not discharge this duty properly.
A doctrine of strict liability has led to the emergence of
the theory of disparate impact. According to this theory,
there is discrimination even in the absence of intent to
discriminate when a neutral policy has a disproportion-
ate effect upon a social group.110 The concept evolved to
include cases of ‘systemic discrimination’, where courts
are looking into whether broader social patterns have
discriminatory effects upon social groups. It migrated in
Europe with the term ‘indirect discrimination’.111
Courts should be encouraged to think in these terms in
order to make wider policy suggestions towards elimi-
nating discrimination. Courts in the US and in Europe
have already elaborated a doctrine of indirect discrimi-
nation. There is more that they can and should do in
this area in the future.
All these legal tools can attack prejudice directly or indi-
rectly. They exercise a pedagogical function and
encourage employers to become conscious of how preju-
dice works. Increasing consciousness can lead to modi-
fying behaviours. In the cases of unconscious discrimi-
nation the legal sanctions should not be compensatory
105. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 244.
106. Ibid., at 246.
107. Krieger, above n. 7, at 1220.
108. Ibid., at 1241.
109. D.B. Oppenheimer, ‘Negligent Discrimination’, 141 University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review 899, at 915-17 (1993).
110. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
111. See I. Tourkochoriti, ‘Jenkins v. Kingsgate and the Migration of the U.S.
Disparate Impact Doctrine in EU Law’, in F. Nicola and B. Davies (eds.),
EU Law Stories (2017).
or punitive damages. Since cognitive biases are to a
great extent unintentional, heavy sanctions do not
appear just. Neither do they guarantee a change in atti-
tudes. On the contrary, they may heighten intergroup
animosity. The state has a more important role to play
in eliminating prejudice through pedagogical methods.
6 Conclusion
As I argued in this article, it is legitimate for the state to
practice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and
minds in order to prevent behaviour that is discrimina-
tory. Liberals accept that it is not legitimate for the state
to intervene in order to change how people think
because ideas and beliefs are wrong in themselves. It is
legitimate for the state to intervene with the actions of a
person only when there is a risk of harm to others and
when there is a threat to social coexistence. Further-
more, it is legitimate for the government to try to per-
suade citizens to eliminate their prejudice because it can
lead them to discriminatory behaviour that can threaten
social coexistence. In the area of preventing discrimi-
nation a more sophisticated reasoning is required as
harm to others is material but also immaterial. Preven-
tive action of the state is legitimate if we consider the
serious harm that discrimination causes. Discrimination
causes material and immaterial harm. It reinforces a
broader context of social power. It harms the social
standing of the person. It causes both psychological and
existential harm. All these harms threaten peaceful
social coexistence. Thus, it is legitimate for the state to
raise awareness of what prejudice is and how it works.
As Locke insightfully notes, although sanctions cannot
change beliefs, persuasion can. In fact, Locke discusses a
moral duty to try to change beliefs that threaten social
coexistence. As Rawls encourages us to think, under a
veil of ignorance of whether we have a characteristic that
might lead to discrimination against us, we would all opt
for rules of justice that eliminate discrimination. Chang-
ing hearts and minds can be justified as a matter of prin-
ciple. It can also be justified for consequentialist consid-
erations. Research in the areas of behavioural psycholo-
gy, neuroscience and social psychology indicates that it
is possible to bring about a change in hearts and minds.
Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of the
person who has experienced discrimination can lead to
understanding her situation. This can lead a person to
critically evaluate her prejudice.
When discrimination materialises in action, it is legiti-
mate to enforce anti-discrimination law. Enforcing anti-
discrimination law should be done with caution as it can
also threaten social bonds. The state has a broad array of
tools that it can use in this area. It can first ‘nudge’ the
citizens towards behaviour that is not discriminatory.
Nudging is not objectionable in this area to the extent
that it aims to incite towards behaviour that is not dis-
criminatory. Through civic education the state can
encourage empathetic understanding towards persons
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that are members of minority groups. If the wrongs of
discrimination are many and the harms particularly
acute upon the social members it concerns, then it is
legitimate for the state to deploy a vast array of medi-
ums towards eliminating it. It can assist NGOs with val-
uable expertise towards engaging in campaigns that raise
awareness against prejudice. And it can enforce anti-
discrimination law in the access to employment and to
goods and services. The state should also be conscious
to encourage solidarity among social groups. Its peda-
gogical and ideological mechanisms should be oriented
towards enhancing feelings of complementarity.
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